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Abstract
We investigate revenue guarantees for auction mechanisms in a model where a distribution is spec-
ified for each bidder, but only some of the distributions are correct. The subset of bidders whose dis-
tribution is correctly specified (henceforth, the “green bidders”) is unknown to the auctioneer. The
question we address is whether the auctioneer can run a mechanism that is guaranteed to obtain at
least as much revenue, in expectation, as would be obtained by running an optimal mechanism on the
green bidders only. For single-parameter feasibility environments, we find that the answer depends
on the feasibility constraint. For matroid environments, running the optimal mechanism using all the
specified distributions (including the incorrect ones) guarantees at least as much revenue in expecta-
tion as running the optimal mechanism on the green bidders. For any feasibility constraint that is not
a matroid, there exists a way of setting the specified distributions and the true distributions such that
the opposite conclusion holds.
1 Introduction
In a seminal paper nearly forty years ago [Mye81], Roger Myerson derived a beautifully precise characteri-
zation of optimal (i.e., revenuemaximizing)mechanisms for Bayesian single-parameter environments. One
way this result has been critiqued over the years is by noting that auctioneers may have incorrect beliefs
about bidders’ values; if so, the mechanism recommended by the theory will actually be suboptimal.
In this paper we evaluate this critique by examining revenue guarantees for optimal mechanisms when a
subset of bidders’ value distributions are misspecified, but the auctioneer doesn’t know which of the distri-
butions are incorrect. Our model is inspired by the literature on semi-random adversaries in the theoretical
computer science literature, particularly the work of Bradac et al. [BGSZ19] on robust algorithms for the
secretary problem. In the model we investigate here, the auctioneer is given (not necessarily identical)
distributions for each of n bidders. An unknown subset of the bidders, called the green bidders, draw their
values independently at random from these distributions. The other bidders, called the red bidders, draw
their values from distributions other than the given ones.
The question we ask in this paper is, “When can one guarantee that the expected revenue of the optimal
mechanism for the given distributions is at least as great as the expected revenue that would be obtained
by excluding the red bidders and running an optimal mechanism on the green subset of bidders?” In
other words, can the presence of bidders with misspecified distributions in a market be worse (for the
auctioneer’s expected revenue) than if those bidders were absent? Or does the increased competition from
∗Email: {marsenis,rdk}@cs.cornell.edu, odysseas-11@hotmail.com.
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incorporating the red bidders always offset the revenue loss due to ascribing the wrong distribution to
them?
We give a precise answer to this question, for single-parameter feasibility environments. We show that the
answer depends on the structure of the feasibility constraint that defines which sets of bidders may win
the auction. For matroid feasibility constraints, the revenue of the optimal mechanism is always greater
than or equal to the revenue obtained by running the optimal mechanism on the set of green bidders.
For any feasibility constraint that is not a matroid, the opposite holds true: there is a way of setting the
specified distribution and the true distributions such that the revenue of the optimal mechanism for the
specified distributions, when bids are drawn from the true distributions, is strictly less than the revenue of
the optimal mechanism on the green bidders only.
The economic intuition behind this result is fairly easy to explain. Thematroid property guarantees that the
winning red bidders in the auction can be put in one-to-one correspondence with losing green bidders who
would have won in the absence of their red competitors, in such a way that the revenue collected from each
winning red bidder offsets the lost revenue from the corresponding green bidder whom he or she displaces.
When the feasibility constraint is not a matroid, this one-to-one correspondence does not always exist; a
single green bidder might be displaced by two or more red bidders each of whom pays almost nothing.
The optimal mechanism allows this to happen at some bid profiles, because the low revenue received on
such bid profiles is compensated by the high expected revenue that would be received if the red bidders
had sampled values from elsewhere in their distributions. However, since the red bidders’ distributions
are misspecified, the anticipated revenue from these more favorable bid profiles may never materialize.
Our result can be interpreted as a type of revenue monotonicity statement for optimal mechanisms in
single-parameter matroid environments. However it does not follow from other known results on revenue
monotonicity, and it is illuminating to draw some points of distinction between our result and earlier ones.
Let us begin by distinguishing pointwise and setwise revenue monotonicity results: the former concern
how the revenue earned on individual bid profiles varies as the bids are increased, the latter concern how
(expected) revenue varies as the set of bidders is enlarged.
• VCG mechanisms are neither pointwise nor setwise revenue monotone in general, but in single-
parametermatroid feasibility environments, VCG revenue satisfies both pointwise and setwisemono-
tonicity. In fact, Dughmi, Roughgarden, and Soundararajan [DRS09] observed that VCG revenue
obeys setwise monotonicity if and only if the feasibility constraint is a matroid. The proof of this
result in [DRS09] rests on a slightly erroneous characterization of matroids, and one (small) contri-
bution of our work is to correct this minor error by substituting a valid characterization of matroids,
namely Lemma 4 below.
• Myerson’s optimal mechanism is not pointwise revenue monotone, even for single-item auctions.
For example, consider using Myerson’s optimal mechanism to sell a single item to Alice whose value
is uniformly distributed in [0, 4] and Bob whose value is uniformly distributed in [0, 8]. When Alice
bids 0 and Bob bids 5, Bob wins and pays 4. If Alice increases her bid to 4, she wins but pays only 3.
• However, Myerson’s optimal mechanism is always setwise revenue monotone in single-parameter
environments with downward-closed feasibility constraints, regardless of whether the feasibility
constraint is a matroid. This is because themechanism’s expected revenue is equal to the expectation
of the maximum, over all feasible sets of winners, of the winners’ combined ironed virtual value.
Enlarging the set of bidders only enlarges the collection of sets over which this maximization is
performed, hence it cannot decrease the expectation of the maximum.
Our main result is analogous to the setwise revenue monotonicity of Myerson revenue, except that we are
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considering monotonicity with respect to the operation of enlarging the set of bidders by adding bidders
whose value distributions are potentially misspecified. We show that the behavior of Myerson revenue with
respect to this stricter notion of setwise revenue monotonicity holds under matroid feasibility constraints
but not under any other feasibility constraints, in contrast to the traditional setwise revenue monotonicity
that is satisfied by Myerson mechanisms under arbitrarily downward-closed constraints.
1.1 Related Work
Semi-random models are a class of models studied in the theoretical computer science literature in which
the input data is partly generated by random sampling, and partly by a worst-case adversary. Initially
studied in the setting of graph coloring [BS95] and graph partitioning [FK01, MMV12], the study of semi-
random models has since been broadened to statistical estimation [DKK+19, LRV16], multi-armed ban-
dits [LMPL18], and secretary problems [BGSZ19]. Our work extends semi-random models into the realm
of Bayesian mechanism design. In particular, our model of green and red bidders resembles in a sense that
of Bradac el al. [BGSZ19] for the secretary problem which served as inspiration for this work. In both
settings, green players/elements behave randomly and independently while red players/elements behave
adversarially. In the secretary model of [BGSZ19], red elements can choose arbitrary arrival times while
green elements’ arrival times are i.i.d. uniform in [0, 1] and independent of the red arrival times. Similarly,
in our setting red bidders can set their bids arbitrarilywhereas green bidders sample their bids from known
distributions, independently of the red bidders and one another.
Our work can be seen as part of a general framework of robust mechanism design, a research direction
inspired by Wilson [Wil87], who famously wrote,
Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences of trading
rules that presumably are really common knowledge; it is deficient to the extent it assumes
other features to be common knowledge, such as one agentâĂŹs probability assessment about
anotherâĂŹs preferences or information. I foresee the progress of game theory as depending
on successive reductions in the base of common knowledge required to conduct useful anal-
yses of practical problems. Only by repeated weakening of common knowledge assumptions
will the theory approximate reality.
ThisWilson doctrine has been used to justify more robust solution concepts such as dominant strategy and
ex post implementation. The question of when these stronger solution concepts are required in order to
ensure robustness was explored in a research program initiated by Bergemann andMorris [BM05] and sur-
veyed in [BM13]. Robustness and the Wilson doctrine have also been used to justify prior-free [GHK+06]
and prior-independent [HR09] mechanisms as well as mechanisms that learn from samples [BDHN19,
CR14, DRY15, HMR18, MR16]. A different approach to robust mechanism design assumes that, rather than
being given the bid distributions, the designer is given constraints on the set of potential bid distributions
and aims to optimize a minimax objective on the expected revenue. For example Azar and Micali [AM13]
assume the seller knows only the mean and variance of each bidder’s distribution, Carrasco et al. [CFK+18]
generalize this to sellers that know the first N moments of each bidder’s distribution, Azar et al. [AMDW13]
consider sellers that know themedian or other quantiles of the distributions, Bergemann and Schlag [BS11]
assume the seller is given distributions that are known to lie in a small neighborhood of the true distribu-
tions, and Carroll [Car17] introduced a model in which bids are correlated but the seller only knows each
bidder’s marginal distribution (see [GL18, BGLT19] for further work in this correlation-robust model).
Another related subject is that of revenue monotonicity of mechanisms — regardless of the existence of
adversarial bidders. Dughmi et al. [DRS09] prove a result very close in spirit to ours. They consider
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the VCG mechanism in a single-parameter downward-closed environment and prove that it is revenue
monotone if and only if the environment is a matroid akin to our Theorems 1 and 2.
Rastegari et al. [RCLB07] study revenue monotonicity properties of mechanisms (including VCG) for Com-
binatorial Auctions. Under some reasonable assumptions, they prove that no mechanism can be revenue
monotone when bidders have single-minded valuations.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Matroids
Given a finite ground set E and a collection I ⊆ 2E of subsets of E such that ∅ ∈ I, we callM = (E,I) a
set system. M is a downward-closed set system if I satisfies the following property:
(I1) (downward-closed axiom) If B ∈ I and A ⊆ B then A ∈ I.
Furthermore,M is called a matroid if it satisfies both (I1) and (I2):
(I2) (exchange axiom) If A, B ∈ I and |A| > |B| then there exists x ∈ A\B such that B + x ∈ I1.
In the context of matroids, sets in (resp. not in) I are called independent (resp. dependent). An (inclusion-
wise) maximal independent set is called a basis. A fundamental consequence of axioms (I1), (I2) is that all
bases of a matroid have equal cardinality and this common quantity is called the rank of the matroid. A
circuit is a minimal dependent set. The set of all circuits of a matroid will be denoted by C. The following
is a standard property of C.
Proposition 1 ([Oxl06, Proposition 1.4.11]). For any C which is the circuit set of a matroidM, let C1,C2 ∈
C, e ∈ C1 ∩C2 and f ∈ C1\C2. Then there exists C3 ∈ C such that f ∈ C3 ⊆ (C1 ∪ C2) − e.
For any set system M = (E,I) and any given S ⊆ E, define I|S = I ∩ 2S and call M|S = (S ,I|S ) the
restriction ofM on S . Notice that restrictions maintain properties (I1), (I2) if they were satisfied already in
M.
In what follows, we provide some examples of common matroids. The reader is invited to check that they
indeed satisfy (I1), (I2). For a more in-depth study of matroid theory, we point the reader to the classic text
of Oxley [Oxl06].
Uniform matroids When I = {S ⊆ E : |S | ≤ k} for some positive integer k ≤ |E|, then (E,I) is called
a uniform (rank k) matroid.
Graphic matroids Given a graph G = (V, E) (possibly containing parallel edges and self-loops) let I
include all subsets of edges which do not form a cycle, i.e. the subgraph G[S ] = (V, S ) is a forest. Then
(E,I) forms a matroid called graphicmatroid. Graphic matroids capture many of the properties of general
matroids and notions like bases and circuits have their graphic counterparts of spanning trees and cycles
respectively.
1We use the shorthand B + x (resp. B − x) to mean B ∪ {x} (resp. B\{x}) throughout the paper.
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Transversal matroids LetG = (A∪B, E) be a simple, bipartite graph and define I to include all subsets
S ⊆ A of vertices for which the induced subgraph on S ∪ B contains a matching covering all vertices in S .
Then (A,I) is called a transversal matroid.
If M = (E,I) is equipped with a weight function w : E → R+ it is called a weighted matroid. The
problem of finding an independent set of maximum sum of weights2 is central to the study of matroids. A
very simple greedy algorithm is guaranteed to find the optimal solution and in fact matroids are exactly
the downward-closed systems for which that greedy algorithm is always guaranteed to find the optimal
solution.
Greedy Sort the elements of E in non-increasing order of weights w(e1) ≥ w(e2) ≥ . . . ≥ w(en). Loop
through the elements in that order adding each element to the current solution as long as the current
solution remains an independent set.
Lemma 1 ([Oxl06, Lemma 1.8.3.]). LetM = (E,I) be a weighted downward-closed set system. Then Greedy
is guaranteed to return an independent set of maximum total weight for every weight function w : E → R+ if
and onlyM is a matroid.
Inwhat followswe’re going to assumewithout loss of generality that the functionw is one-to-one,meaning
that no two element have the same weight. All proofs can be adapted to work in the general case using
any deterministic tie breaking rule.
The following proposition provides a convenient way for updating the solution to an optimization problem
under matroid constraints when new elements are added. A proof is included in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. Let M = (E,I) be a weighted matroid with weight function w : E → R+. Consider the
max-weight independent set I of the restricted matroidM|E−x. Then the max-weight independent set I∗ ofM
can be obtained from I as follows: if (I + x) ∈ I then I∗ = I + x, otherwise, I∗ = (I + x) − y where y is the
minimum-weight element in the unique circuit C of I + x.
2.2 Optimal Mechanism Design
We study auctions modeled as a Bayesian single-parameter environment, a standard mechanism design
setting in which a seller (or mechanism designer) holds many identical copies of an item they want to sell.
A set of n bidders (or players), numbered 1 through n, participate in the auction and each bidder i has a
private, non-negative value 3i ∼ Fi, sampled (independently across bidders) from a distribution Fi known
to the seller. Abusing notation, we’ll use Fi to also denote the cumulative distribution function and fi to
denote the probability density function of the respective distribution. The value of each bidder expresses
their valuation for receiving one item. Let Vi be the support of distribution Fi and define V = V1 × . . .×Vn.
For a vector v ∈ V , we use the standard notation v−i = (31, . . . , 3i−1, 3i+1, . . . , 3n) to express the vector of
valuations of all bidders except bidder i. When the index set [n] is partitioned into two sets A, B and we
have vectors vA ∈ RA, wB ∈ RB, we will abuse notation and let (vA,wB) denote the vector obtained by
interleaving vA and wB, i.e. (vA,wB) is the vector u ∈ Rn specified by
ui =

vi if i ∈ A
wi if i ∈ B.
Similarly, when v ∈ V , i ∈ [n], and z ∈ R, (z, v−i) will denote the vector obtained by replacing the ith
component of v with z.
2An equivalent formulation asks for a basis of maximum total weight.
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A feasibility constraint I ⊆ 2[n] defines all subsets of bidders that can be simultaneously declared winners
of the auction. We will interchangeably denote elements of I both as subsets of [n] and as vectors in
{0, 1}n. Of special interest are feasibility constraints which define the independent sets of a matroid. We
will sometimes use the phrase matroid market to indicate this fact. Matroid markets model many real
world applications. For example when selling k identical copies of an item, the market is a uniform rank
k matroid. Another example is kidney exchange markets which can be modeled as transversal matroids
([RSU05]).
In a sealed-bid auction, each bidder i submits a bid bi ∈ Vi simultaneously to the mechanism. Formally, a
mechanism A is a pair (x, p) of an allocation rule x : V → I accepting the bids and choosing a feasible
outcome and a payment rule p : V → Rn assigning each bidder a monetary payment they need to make to
the mechanism. We denote by xi(b) (or just xi when clear from the context) the i-th component of the 0-1
vector x(b) and similarly for p. An allocation rule is calledmonotone if the function xi(z, b−i) is monotone
non-decreasing in z for any vector b−i ∈ V−i and any bidder i.
We assume bidders have quasilinear utilities meaning that bidder’s i utility for winning the auction and
having to pay a price pi is ui = 3i − pi and 0 if they do not win and pay nothing. Bidders are selfish agents
aiming to maximize their own utility.
A mechanism is called truthful if bidding bi = 3i is a dominant strategy for each bidder, i.e. no bidder can
increase their utility by reporting bi , 3i regardless the values and bids of the other bidders. An allocation
rule x is called implementable if there exists a payment rule p such that (x, p) is truthful. Such mechanisms
are well understood and easy to reason about since we can predict how the bidders are going to behave.
In what follows we focus our attention only on truthful mechanisms and thus use the terms value and bid
interchangeably.
A well known result of Myerson ([Mye81]) states that a given allocation rule x is implementable if and
only if x is monotone. In case x is monotone, Myerson gives an explicit formula for the unique3 payment
rule such that (x, p) is truthful. In the single-parameter setting we’re studying, the payment rule can be
informally described as follows: pi is equal to the minimum bi that bidder i has to report such that they
are included in the set of winners — we’ll refer to such a bi as the critical bid of bidder i.
The mechanism designer, who is collecting all the payments, commonly aims to maximize her expected
revenue which for a mechanismA is defined as Rev(A) = Ebi∼Fi
[∑
i∈[n] pi
]
.
Lemma 2 ([Mye81]). For any truthful mechanism (x, p) and any bidder i ∈ [n]:
E
[
pi
]
= E
[
φi(bi) · xi(bi, b−i)
]
where the expectations are taken over b1, . . . , bn ∼ F1, . . . , Fn, the function φi(·) is defined as
φi(z) = z −
1 − Fi(z)
fi(z)
and φi(bi) is called the virtual value of bidder i.
The importance of this lemma is that it reduces the problem of revenue maximization to that of virtual
welfare maximization. More specifically, consider a sequence of distributions F1, . . . , Fn which have the
property that all φi are monotone non-decreasing (such distributions are called regular). In this case, the
3Unique up to the normalizing assumption that pi = 0 whenever bi = 0.
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allocation rule that chooses a set of bidders with the maximum total virtual value (subject to feasibility con-
straints) is monotone (a consequence of the regularity condition) and thus implementable. We’ll frequently
denote this revenue-maximizing mechanism by MyerOPT.
More precisely, the MyerOPT mechanism works as follows:
• Collect bids bi from every bidder i ∈ [n].
• Compute φi(bi) and discard all bidders whose virtual valuation is negative.
• Solve the optimization problem S ∗ = argmaxS ∈I
∑
i∈S φi(bi).
• Allocate the items to S ∗ and charge each bidder i ∈ S ∗ their critical bid.
Handling non-regular distributions is possible using the standard technique of ironing. Very briefly, it
works as follows. So far, we’ve been expressing x, p and φ as a function of the random vector v. It is
convenient to switch to the quantile space and express them as a function of a vector q ∈ [0, 1]n where
for a given sample z from Fi we let qi = Prbi∼Fi [bi ≥ z]. Another way to think of this is, instead of
sampling values, we sample quantiles qi distributed uniformly at random in the interval [0, 1] which are
then transformed into values vi(qi) = F−1i (1−qi)
4. Let Ri(qi) = qi ·vi(qi) and notice that φi(vi(qi)) =
dRi
dq
∣∣∣∣
q=qi
.
Now, since vi(·) is a non-increasing function we have that φi(·) is monotone if and only if R is concave.
Now, suppose that Fi is such that Ri is not concave. One can consider the concave hull of Ri of Ri which
replaces Ri with a straight line in every interval that Ri was not following that concave hull. The corre-
sponding function φi(·) =
dRi
dq
is called ironed virtual value function.
Lemma 3 ([Har, Theorem 3.18]). For any monotone allocation rule x and any virtual value function φi of
bidder i, the expected virtual welfare of i is upper bounded by their expected ironed virtual value welfare.
E
[
φi(vi(qi)) · xi(vi(qi), v−i(q))
]
≤ E
[
φi(vi(qi)) · xi(vi(qi), v−i(q))
]
Furthermore, the inequality holds with equality if the allocation rule x is such that for all bidders i, x′
i
(q) = 0
whenever Ri(q) > Ri(q).
As a consequence, consider the monotone allocation rule which allocates to a feasible set of maximum
total ironed virtual value. On the intervals where Ri(q) > Ri(q), Ri is linear as part of the concave hull
so the ironed virtual value function, being a derivative of a linear function, is a constant. Therefore, the
allocation rule is not affected when q ranges in such an interval.
A crucial property of any (ironed) virtual value function φ corresponding to a distribution F is that z ≥ φ(z)
for all z in the support of F. This is obvious for φ as defined in Lemma 2. We claim it also holds for ironed
virtual value functions: if z lies in an interval where φ = φ it holds trivially. Otherwise, if z ∈ [a, b] for
some interval where φ needed ironing (i.e. R(q) > R(q) in the quantile space), we have: z ≥ a ≥ φ(a) =
φ(a) = φ(z). We’ve thus proven:
Proposition 3. Any (possibly non-regular) distribution F having an ironed virtual value function φ satisfies:
z ≥ φ(z)
for any z in the support of F.
Remark 1. For simplicity, in the remainder of the paper we’ll use φ and φ interchangeably and we will
refer to φ as virtual value function. The reader should keep in mind that if the associated distribution is
non-regular, then ironed virtual value functions should be used instead.
4In general, vi(qi) = min {v | Fi(v) ≥ qi}.
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3 Revenue Monotonicity on Matroid Markets
We extend the standard single-parameter environment to allow for bidders with misspecified distributions.
Formally, the n bidders are partitioned into sets G and R; the former are called green and the latter red. The
color of each bidder (green or red) is not revealed to the mechanism designer at any point. Green bidders
sample their values from their respective distribution Fi but red bidders are sampling vi ∼ F′i for some
{F′
i
}i∈R which are completely unknown to the mechanism designer and can be adversarially chosen.
In this section we are interested in studying the behavior of Myerson’s optimal mechanismwhen designed
under the (wrong) assumption that vi ∼ Fi for all i ∈ [n]. Specifically, we ask the question of whether the
existence of the red bidders could harm the expected revenue of the seller compared to the case where
the seller was able to identify and exclude the red bidders, thus designing the optimal mechanism for the
green bidders alone. The following definition makes this notion of revenue monotonicity more precise.
Definition 1 (RMMB). Consider a single-parameter, downward-closed market M = (E,I) of |E| = n
bidders. A mechanismA is Revenue Monotone under Misspecified Bidders (RMMB) if for any distributions
F1, . . . , Fn, any number 1 ≤ k ≤ n of green bidders and any fixed misspecified bids b′R ∈ R
R of the red
bidders:
E [Rev(A(bG , bR))] ≥ E [Rev(A(bG))] (1)
where both expectation are taken over bG ∼
∏
i∈G Fi.
An alternative definition of the revenue monotonicity property allows red bidders to have stochastic val-
uations drawn from distributions F′
i
, Fi instead of fixed bids. We note that the two definitions are
equivalent: ifA is RMMB according to Definition 1 then inequality (1) holds pointwise for any fixed mis-
specified bids and thus would also hold in expectation. For the other direction, if inequality (1) holds in
expectation over the red bids, regardless of the choice of distributions {F′
i
| i ∈ R} then we may specialize
to the case when each F′
i
is a point-mass distribution with a single support point bi for each i ∈ R, and
then Definition 1 follows.
In what follows we assume bidders always submit bids that fall within the support of their respective
distribution. Green bidders obviously follow that rule and red bidders should do as well, otherwise the
mechanism could recognize they are red and just ignore them.
Consider first the simpler case of selling a single item. This corresponds to a uniform rank 1 matroid
market. Intuitively when the item is allocated to a green bidder, the existence of the red bidders is not
problematic and in fact could help increase the critical bid and thus the payment of the winner. On the
other hand, when a red bidder wins one has to prove that they are not charged too little and thus risk
bringing the expected revenue down.
Let m = max(maxi∈G φi(bi), 0) be the random variable denoting the highest non-negative virtual value in
the set of green bidders. Let also X be an indicator a random variable which is 1 if the winner belongs to
G and Y denote an indicator random variable which is 1 if the winner belongs to R. For the mechanism
MyerOPT have:
E
[
revenue from green bidders
]
= E [m · X] (2)
E [revenue from red bidders] ≥ E [m · Y] (3)
where (2) follows from Myerson’s lemma and (3) follows from the observation that the winner of the
optimal auction never pays less than the second-highest virtual value. To see why the latter holds, let φs
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be the second highest virtual value, r be the red winner and g is the green player with the highest virtual
value. The critical bid of the red winner is at least φ−1r (φs) ≥ φ
−1
r (φg(bg)) ≥ φg(bg) where we applied the
fact that x ≥ φ(x) to the virtual value function φ = φr and the value x = φ−1r (φg(bg)).
Summing (2) and (3) and using the fact that X + Y = 1 whenever m > 0, we find:
E [Revenue from all bidders 1, . . . , n] ≥ E [m · X] + E [m · Y]
= E [m]
= E
[
revenue of MyerOPT on G
]
We therefore concluded that Myerson’s optimal mechanism is RMMB in the single-item case. We are now
ready to generalize the above idea to any matroid market.
Theorem 1. LetM = (E,I) be any matroid market. Then MyerOPT inM is RMMB
Proof. Call G the set of green bidders and R the set of red bidders. Let (x, p) denote the allocation and
payment rules for the mechanism MyerOPT that runs Myerson’s optimal mechanism on all n bidders,
using the given distribution of each. Let (x′, p′) denote the allocation and payment rules for themechanism
MyerOPTG that runs Myerson’s optimal mechanism in the bidder set G only. For a set S ⊆ [n], let TS be
the random variable denoting the independent subset of S that maximizes the sum of ironed virtual values.
In other words, TS is the set of winners chosen by Myerson’s optimal mechanism on bidder set S .
By Myerson’s Lemma, the revenue of MyerOPTG satisfies:
E

∑
i∈G
p′i(b)
 = E

∑
i∈G
x′i(b) · φi(bi)
 (4)
By linearity of expectation, we can break up the expected revenue of MyerOPT into two terms as follows:
E

∑
i∈[n]
pi(b)
 = E

∑
i∈G
pi(b)
 + E

∑
i∈R
pi(b)
 (5)
The first term on the right side of (5) expresses the revenue original from the green bidders. Using My-
erson’s Lemma, we can equate this revenue with the expectation of the green winners’ combined virtual
value:
E

∑
i∈G
pi(b)
 = E

∑
i∈G
xi(b) · φi(bi)
 . (6)
To express the revenue coming from the red bidders in terms of virtual valuations, we provide the argument
that follows. One way to derive TG+R from TG is to start with TG and sequentially add elements of TG+R∩R
in arbitrary order while removing at each step the least weight element in the circuit that potentially forms
(repeated application of Proposition 2). Let e be the i-th red element we’re adding. If no circuit forms after
the addition, then e pays the smallest value in its support which is a non-negative quantity. Otherwise, let
C be the unique circuit that forms after that addition. Let f be the minimum weight element in C and let
b f be the associated bid made by player f . Notice that f must be green; by assumption, every red element
we’re adding is part of the eventual optimal solution so it cannot be removed at any stage of this process.
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The price charged to e is their critical bid which we claim is at least φ−1e (φ f (b f )). The reason is that e is
part of circuit C and f is the min-weight element of that circuit. The min-weight element of a circuit is
never in the max-weight independent set5 so if bidder e bids any value v such that φe(v) < φ f (b f ) they will
certainly not be included in the set of winners, TG+R. By Proposition 3 it follows that φ−1e (φ f (b f )) ≥ φ f (b f )
thus pe(b) ≥ φ f (b f ).
The above reasoning allows us “charge” each red bidder’s payment to a green player’s virtual value in
TG \ TG+R:
E

∑
i∈R
pi(b)
 ≥ E

∑
i∈TG\TG+R
φi(bi)

= E

∑
i∈G
(x′i (b) − xi(b)) · φi(bi)
 (7)
The second line is justified by observing that for i ∈ G, x′
i
(b) = xi(b) unless i ∈ TG \ TG+R, in which case
x′
i
(b) − xi(b) = 1.
Combining Equations (4)-(7) we get:
E

∑
i∈[n]
pi(b)
 ≥ E

∑
i∈G
xi(b) · φi(bi)
 + E

∑
i∈G
(x′i (b) − xi(b)) · φi(bi)

= E

∑
i∈G
x′i (b) · φi(bi)
 = E

∑
i∈G
p′i (b)

In other words, the expected revenue of MyerOPT is greater than or equal to that of MyerOPTG .

4 General Downward-Closed Markets
When the market is not a matroid, the existence of red bidders can do a lot of damage to the revenue of
the mechanism as shown in the following simple example.
Example 1. Consider a 3-element downward-closed set system on E = {a, b, c} with maximal feasible
sets: {a, b} and {c}. Let c be a green bidder with a deterministic value of 1 and a, b be red bidders each with
a specified value distribution given by the following cumulative distribution function F(x) = 1− (1+ x)1−N
for some parameter N. Note that the associated virtual value function is:
φ(x) = x −
1 − F(x)
f (x)
= x −
(1 + x)1−N
(N − 1)(1 + x)−N
= x − 1+x
N−1
=
(
1 − 1
N−1
)
x − 1
N−1
.
For this virtual value function we have φ−1(0) = 1
N−2
, φ−1(1) = N
N−2
.
Consider the revenue of Myerson’s mechanism when the red bidders, instead of following their specified
distribution, they each bid φ−1(1) — and the green bidder bids 1, the only support point of their distribution.
5This is a consequence of the optimality of the Greedy algorithm since the min-weight element of a circuit is the last to be
considered among the elements of the circuit and its inclusion will violate independence.
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The set {a, b} wins over {c} since the former sums to a total virtual value of 2 over the latter’s virtual value
1 so bidders a, b pay their critical bid.
To compute that, notice that each of the bidders a, b could unilaterally decrease their bid to any ε > 1
N−2
and they would still win the auction since the set {a, b} would still have a total virtual value greater than
1. Therefore, each of a, b pays 1
N−2
for a total revenue of 2
N−2
.
On the other hand, the same mechanism when run on the set {c} of only the green bidder, always allocates
an item to c and collects a total revenue of 1.
Letting N → ∞ we see that the former revenue tends to zero while the latter remains 1, violating the
revenue monotonicity property of Definition 1 by an unbounded multiplicative factor.
To generalize the above idea to any non-matroid set system we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4. A downward-closed set system S = (E,I) is not a matroid if and only if there exist I, J ∈ I with
the following properties:
1. For every K ∈ I|I∪J , if |K| ≥ |I| then K ⊇ I\J.
2. |J\I| ≥ 1.
3. I is a maximum cardinality element of I|I∪J .
Proof. For the forward direction, suppose S is not a matroid and let V be a minimum-cardinality subset of
E that is not a matroid. Since I|V is downward-closed and non-empty, it must violate the exchange axiom.
Hence, there exist sets I, J ∈ I|V such that |I| > |J| but J + x < I for all x ∈ I\J. Note that V = I ∪ J, since
otherwise I ∪ J is a strictly smaller subset of E satisfying the property that (I ∪ J,I|I∪J) is not a matroid.
Observe that J is a maximal element of IV . The reason is that V = I ∪ J, so every element of V\J belongs
to I. By our assumption on the pair I, J, there is no element y ∈ I such that J + y ∈ I|V . Since I|V is
downward-closed, it follows that no strict superset of J belongs to I|V .
We now proceed to prove that I, J satisfy the required properties of the lemma:
(1) Let K ∈ IV with |K| ≥ |I|. It follows that |K| > |J|, but J is maximal in I|V , so K and J must violate
the exchange axiom. Thus, I|K∪J is not a matroid. By the minimality of V , this implies K ∪ J = V
hence K ⊇ I\J.
(2) If J\I = ∅ then J ⊆ I which contradicts the fact that I, J violate the exchange axiom.
(3) Suppose there exists I′ ∈ I|V with |I′| > |I|, then by property (1) we have I′ ⊇ I\J. Remove elements
of I\J from I′ one by one, in arbitrary order, until we reach a set K ∈ IV such that |K| = |I|. This
is possible because after the entire set I\J is removed from I′, what remains is a subset of J, hence
has strictly fewer elements than I. The set K thus constructed has |K| = |I| but K + I\J, violating
property (1).
For the “only if” direction, supposing that S is a matroid, we must show that no I, J ∈ I satisfy all three
properties. To this end, suppose I and J satisfy (2) and (3). Since S|I∪J is a matroid, there exists K ⊇ J
such that K ∈ I|I∪J and |K| = |I|. By property (2), we know that no |I|-element superset of J contains I − J
as a subset. Therefore, the set K violates property (1). 
We are now ready to generalize Example 1 to every non-matroid set system.
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Theorem 2. For anyM = (E,I) which is not a matroid, MyerOPT is not RMMB.
Proof. Consider a downward-closedM = (E,I) which is not a matroid. We are going to show there exists
a partition of players into green and red sets and a choice of valuation distributions and misspecified red
bids such that the RMMB property is violated.
Let I, J ⊆ E be the subsets whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma 4. Define G = J to be the set of green
bidders, R = I\J to be the set of red bidders. All other bidders are irrelevant and can be assumed to be
bidding zero. Set the value of each green bidder to be deterministically equal to 1. For each red bidder r,
the specified value distribution has the same cumulative distribution function F(x) = 1−(1+ x)1−N defined
in Example 1.
Now let’s consider the expected revenue of Myerson’s mechanismwhen every bidder in R bids φ−1(1).6 Ev-
ery bidder’s virtual value is 1, so the mechanismwill choose any set of winners with maximum cardinality
which, according to Lemma 4, property (3), is |I|. For example, the set of winners could be I7.
A consequence of Lemma 4, property (1) is that for every red bidder r there is no set of bidders disjoint from
{r} with combined virtual value greater than |I| − 1. Thus each red bidder pays φ−1(0). Elements of I ∩ J
correspond to green bidders who win the auction and pay 1, because a green bidder pays 1 whenever they
win. There are |I ∩ J| such bidders. Thus, the Myerson revenue is |I ∩ J| + 1
N−2
|I\J|. The optimal auction
on the green bidders alone charges each of these bidders a price of 1, receiving revenue |J| = |I ∩ J|+ |J\I|.
This exceeds |I ∩ J| + 1
N−2
|I\J| as long as
(N − 2) · |J\I| > |I\J|. (8)
This inequality is satisfied, for example, when N = |I\J|+3, because J\I has at least one element (Lemma 4,
property (2)). 
5 Open Questions
The previous section concluded with a proof that for any non-matroid system, the ratio r = E[Rev(G)]
E[Rev(G∪R)] for
Myerson’s optimal mechanism can be greater than 1. An interesting question is whether that ratio can be
made arbitrarily large as in Example 1. If the sets I, J in the above proof are such that I ∩ J = ∅, then the
ratio can be made unbounded with the same construction. We do not know if possibly another choice of
red/green bidders and their distributions can give an unbounded ratio for all non-matroid system.
A broader question our work leaves unanswered is whether it’s possible to design other mechanisms (po-
tentially non-truthful) that, in the presence of red and green bidders in non-matroid downward-closed
market, can always guarantee a constant approximation to Myerson’s revenue on the green bidders alone.
For instance, in Example 1, one could possibly consider randomized mechanisms that ignore a random
bidder in the set {a, b} before running Myerson’s auction.
6Members of G bid as well, but it hardly matters, because their bid is always 1 — the only support point of their value
distribution — so the auctioneer knows their value without their having to submit a bid.
7In general, the mechanism might choose any set W of winners such that |W | = |I|. The way to handle this case is similar to
the one used in the proof of Theorem 3 in the Appendix.
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A Missing proofs
Here we provide a proof of Proposition 2 for updating the optimal solution of a weighted matroid:
Proof. Consider running the Greedy algorithm in parallel on bothM|E−x andM and call these executions
E−,E respectively.
In case (I+x) ∈ I, the downward-closed property ofM guarantees that both executionswill make identical
decisions on elements other than x and element x will be included in the optimal solution of M, hence
I∗ = I + x.
For the other case, suppose first that x = y, i.e. x is the min-weight element on C. At the time x is
inspected, all other elements of C have already been inspected and added to the current solution, hence x
is not included since it would violate independence. Therefore, both executions proceed making identical
decisions in every step and arrive to the same solution I∗ = (I + x) − x = I.
Now suppose that x , y. At the time element x is considered in E, it can be safely included in the solution.
The reason is that if adding x resulted in a circuit C′, then C′ ( C violating the minimality of C. The next
step at which the two executions will diverge again is when considering y — if they diverged at a previous
step it would again mean that x is part of a circuit C′ ( C — at this point E ignores y.
Finally, suppose that the two executions diverge at a later step on an element e with w(e) < w(y). Denote
by J the current solution E− is maintaining and thus (J + x)− y is the current solution of E. There are two
reasons the executions might diverge:
• (J + e) ∈ I but ((J + x) − y) + e < I.
In this case, there must exist circuit C′ ⊆ ((J + x) − y) + e such that x, e ∈ C′ and y < C′. Therefore,
by Proposition 1 there exists circuit C′′ such that e ∈ C′′ ⊆ (C′ ∪ C) − x. This is a contradiction
because C′′ is a circuit of J + e which was assumed to be independent.
• (J + e) < I but ((J + x) − y) + e ∈ I.
This case is similar and the proof is omitted.

B A note on revenue monotonicity of VCG
A revenue monotonicity result similar to ours is proven for VCG in matroid markets in [DRS09]. We
noticed that one of the propositions used in the proof of that theorem is incorrect. Here we provide a
counter-example and offer an alternative proof using our Lemma 4.
Proposition 2.9 of [DRS09] claims that “A downward-closed set system (U,I) with I , ∅ is a matroid if and
only if for every pair A, B of maximal sets in I and y ∈ B, there is some x ∈ A such that A\{x} ∪ {y} ∈ I”.
Here we notice that the “backward” direction of this proposition does not hold.
Consider the following counter-example. Let U = {a, b, c, d, e} and define I3 to be the independent sets
of the uniform rank 3 matroid on the 4-element subset {a, b, c, d}. Now let I be the downwards-closed
closure of I3 ∪ {{a, c, e}, {b, d, e}}. We claim S = (U,I) violates the above proposition.
• (U,I) is not a matroid: This is easy to see as I = {a, c, e}, J = {d, e} violate the exchange property.
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• Nevertheless, for every pair A, B maximal sets in I and y ∈ B, there is some x ∈ A such that
A\{x} ∪ {y} ∈ I.
First, notice that is suffices to show this for all y ∈ B\A. Otherwise, if y ∈ A ∩ B then set x = y in
which case A\{x} ∪ {y} = A ∈ I.
A second observation is that if both A, B are contained in {a, b, c, d} then the statements holds; after
all the forward direction of the proposition holds and the restriction of S on that 4-element subset
is a matroid.
Finally, notice that S is symmetric under a permutation that swaps the roles of a ↔ b and c ↔ d.
The following table summarizes a case analysis on the choice of A, B, y and provides a choice of x
for each that satisfy the aforementioned property. The cases that are missing are equivalent to one
of the cases in the table under symmetry.
A B y x
{a, c, e} {b, d, e} b e
{a, c, e} {a, c, d} d e
{a, c, e} {b, c, d} b e
{a, c, d} {a, c, e} e d
{b, c, d} {a, c, e} a b
{b, c, d} {a, c, e} e c
We now turn into providing a proof of the “only if” direction of Theorem 4.1 in [DRS09].
We use the notation 1[S ] for any subset S ⊆ U of bidder to mean the bidding profile where every bidder
in S bids 1 and every bidder in U\V bids 0.
Theorem 3 (“only if” direction of [DRS09, Theorem 4.1] ). Let (U,I) be a downward-closed set system that
is not a matoid, then there exists a set V ⊆ U and an element x ∈ V such that the revenue of VCG on bid
profile 1[V − x] exceed the revenue of VCG on bid profile 1[V].
Proof. By Lemma 4, there exist I, J ∈ I with properties (1)-(3). Let V = I ∪ J and let x be an arbitrary
element of I\J. We will prove that the revenue of VCG on 1[V] is less than the revenue of VCG on 1[V− x].
Consider the VCG payment of every bidder in the bid profile 1[V]. Since I is a maximum cardinality ele-
ment of I|V (Lemma 4, property (3)), we may choose I as the set of winners. Let W denote the intersection
of all elements of I|V that have cardinality |I|. By property (1) of Lemma 4, I − J ⊆ W . Every element of W
pays zero, because for y ∈ W the maximum cardinality elements of I|V−y have size |I| − 1, hence y could
bid zero and still belong to a winning set. On the other hand, every element y ∈ I − W pays 1, because by
the definition of W there is a set K ∈ I|V such that |K| = |I| but y < K. If y lowers its bid below 1, then K
rather than I would be selected as the set of winners, hence y must pay 1 in the VCG mechanism. Finally,
bidders not in I pay zero because they are not winners. The VCG revenue on bid profile 1[V] is therefore
|I\W |.
Now recall that x denotes an arbitrary element of I\J, and consider the VCG payment of every bidder in
the bid profile 1[V − x]. Since V − x is a proper subset of V , (V − x,I|V−x) is a matroid. The rank of this
matroid is |I|−1, since Lemma 4, property (1) implies thatI|V−x contains no sets of size |I|. We may assume
that I− x is chosen as the set of winners of VCG. Let J′ denote a superset of J that is a basis of (V− x,I|V−x).
If y is an element of (I\J′) − x, the set I − x − y has strictly fewer elements than J′ so the exchange axiom
implies there is some z ∈ J′ such that I − x− y+ z ∈ I. This set I − x− y+ z is a basis of (V − x,I|V−x) that
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does not contain y, hence the VCG payment of any y ∈ (I\J′) − x is 1. Now consider any y ∈ I\W . By the
definition of W , there is a set K ∈ I|V such that |K| = |I| but y < K. Then K − x is a basis of (V − x,I|V−x)
but y < K, implying that y’s VCG payment is 1.
We have shown that in the bid profile1[V], the bidders in I\W pay 1 and all other bidders pay zero, whereas
in the bid profile 1[V − x], the bidders in I\W still pay 1 and, in addition, the bidders in (I\J′) − x pay 1.
Furthermore the set (I\J′) − x is non-empty. To see this, observe that |J′| = |I| − 1 = |I − x|, but J′ , I − x
because then J would be a subset of I, contrary to our assumption that I, J satisfy Lemma 4, property (2).
Hence, I − x contains at least one element that does not belong to J′, meaning (I\J′) − x is nonempty. We
have thus proven that the VCG revenue of 1[V − x] exceeds the VCG revenue of 1[V] by at least |I− J′− x|,
which is at least 1. 
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